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Wartime Internment of Japanese-Americans:
An Examination of Current Reparations
Proposals
During World War II the United States government
removed 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry' from the West
Coast and interned them in relocation centers hundreds of miles
from their homes. The main justification given for this action
was the prevention of sabotage and espionage. In retrospect,
however, the suspicion of sabotage and espionage by Japanese-
Americans was unfounded.' The suddenness of the evacuation
and lack of adequate safeguards resulted in effectively requiring
Japanese-Americans to abandon their homes, possessions and
jobs. Estimates of their losses in both physical injury and prop-
erty damage are in the billions of dollars.$
Because the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional-
ity of the evacuation out of deference to military judgment in
times of war, Japanese-American claims based on internment
injuries are precluded from judicial remedy.4 The Court has rec-
1. At the time of the internment, persons of Japanese ancestry included both citi-
zens and non-citizens. At that time, the law forbade first generation immigrants (Issei)
from becoming citizens. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
The second (Nisei) and third (Sansei) generations gained citizenship automatically by
birth in this country. Those interned consisted primarily of Issei and Nisei.
This comment uses the term Japanese-Americans to refer to all persons of Japanese
ancestry regardless of citizenship at the time of the internment.
2. See infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 86.
4. The constitutional issues raised by the evacuation and internment are beyond the
scope of this article. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the military's actions. Korematau v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v. United
States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Commen-
tators have criticized the Supreme Court decisions. Freeman, Genesis, Exodus, and
Leviticus Geneology, Evacuation, and Law, 28 CoRNmLS, L.Q. 414 (1943); Rostow, The
Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALz L.J. 489 (1945). Contra Alexandre, The
Nisei-A Casualty of World War I, 23 CORNmLL L.Q. 385 (1943). The Supreme Court
itself granted a habeas corpus petition in at least one detention of a concededly loyal
Japanese-American. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Nonetheless, with the creation
of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, several Japa-
nese-American groups have raised constitutional challenges to the evacuation and intern-
ment. See, e.g., Bay Area Attorneys for Redress, Brief by Bay Area Attorneys for
Redress on Selected Constitutional Issues Before the Commission on Wartime Reloca-
tion and Internment of Civilians (1981) and Subcommittee on Japanese-American
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ognized, however, that Congress may remedy judicially
noncognizable claims.' Recognizing its ability to remedy the
inequity done to the Japanese-Americans and the need for a
remedy, Congress has established a commission to investigate
the causes of the internment and extent of the injury suffered,
and to recommend an appropriate remedy.6 Various groups have
proposed numerous alternative remedies ranging from direct
compensation to establishing a corporation to fund projects ben-
efiting the Japanese-American community.
To remedy Japanese-American claims, Congress must
acknowledge the extensive injuries that resulted from the gov-
ernment's evacuation and subsequent internment of Japanese-
Americans and the inadequacy of its previous remedy. Congress
also must exercise its ability to remedy the equitable claims of
Japanese-Americans by enacting a remedial plan that provides
both direct and indirect compensation for injuries suffered as a
result of the evacuation and internment.
This comment will analyze the proposed remedies in light of
the injury done by the internment. First, a discussion of the his-
tory surrounding the internment will establish the existence of
an injury and the extent of the injury suffered by the Japanese-
Americans. Second, the previous remedy will be examined.
Third, this comment will establish that Congress has the power
to satisfy judicially noncognizable claims and that Japanese-
American claims justify Congressional action. Fourth, the goals a
remedial plan must seek to achieve will be examined. Finally,
the individual remedial plans are analyzed in light of those
goals, ultimately concluding a plan involving both direct and
Redress/Reparations, Legal Services Section, State Bar of California, Japanese-American
Redress and Reparations: A Basis for Congressional Action (July 1981) (report submit-
ted at public hearing before Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians, Washington, D.C.). These challenges include denial of fifth amendment due
process rights, denial of first amendment freedom of speech rights, and denial of the
sixth amendment right to trial. Id.
5. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440-41 (1896).
6. Act of July 31, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-317, 94 Stat. 964 (1980).
It is the purpose of this Act to establish a commission to (1) review the facts
and circumstances surrounding Executive Order 9066, issued February 19,
1942, and the impact of such Executive Order on American citizens and per-
manent resident aliens; (2) review directives of United States military forces
requiring the relocation and, in some cases, detention in internment camps of
American citizens, including Aleut civilians, and permanent resident aliens of
the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands; and (3) recommend appropriate remedies.
Act of July 31, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-317 § 2(b), 94 Stat. 964 (1980).
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indirect compensation that most effectively meets those goals.
In 1941, President Roosevelt, realizing war with Japan was
imminent, and fearing the potential of internal subversion,
ordered a secret investigation to determine the loyalty of Japa-
nese-Americans.' This investigation culminated in the Munson
Report revealing that Japanese-Americans were extraordinarily
loyal, that intelligence services had identified what few suspect
individuals were present, and concluding there was no "Japanese
problem." s Moreover, with the outbreak of war,9 the FBI imme-
diately rounded up all Japanese-Americans suspected of being
enemy aliens.10 Thus, shortly after the outbreak of war the
threat to national security identified in the Munson Report had
been eliminated.
Immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor public opin-
ion was largely sympathetic towards Japanese-Americans.11 In
subsequent months public sentiment changed. Statements from
both the military and anti-Japanese groups accusing Japanese-
Americans of subversion and suggesting their evacuation mobi-
lized public support for an evacuation."'
7. M. WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION
CAMPS 34 (1976).
8. Id. at 33-53.
9. Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The United States declared
war the following day. S.J. Res. 116, 55 Stat. 795 (1941).
10. A. BOSWORTH, AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 45-48 (1967).
11. C. MCWILLIAMS, PREJUDICE, JAPANEsR-AMEmCANS SYMBOL OF RACIAL INTOLER-
ANCE 112 (1971).
12. By March, 1942, public sentiment was strongly in favor of evacuation. B.
HOSOKAWA, NISEI: THE QuIET AMERICANS, 264-92 (1969). The military gave many reasons
to justify the evacuation. First, the evacuation was necessary to protect the West Coast
from sabotage, espionage, and other fifth column activities. The military thought that
persons of Japanese ancestry living in the United States supported and approved of
Japan's military aggression, and that the Japanese government exerted great influence
over them. Second, military and political leaders said the Japanese people had settled
around strategic military points to support an invasion by the Japanese government.
Third, the evacuation was necessary to protect Japanese-Americans from violent anti-
Japanese sentiment and they could prove their loyalty by cooperating with the evacua-
tion. Fourth, the government could not separate the loyal Japanese-Americans from the
disloyal. M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION
400-10 (1949).
General DeWitt expressed the sentiment of the time: "In the war in which we are
now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an
enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States
soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized', the racial
strains are undiluted." J.L. DEWIrr, FINAL REPORT JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE
WEST COAST 1942, 34 (1943). In fact, no Japanese-American was found to be disloyal, or
was charged or convicted of espionage or sabotage. M. WECLYN, supra, note 7, at 29.
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Despite the findings of the Munson Report, President
Roosevelt responded to public opinion and pressure from the
military and set the evacuation machinery in motion. On Febru-
ary 19, 1942, the President signed Executive Order 9066.18 The
order authorized the Secretary of War to establish military areas
and regulate travel within them.14 To carry out the mandate of
Executive Order 9066, the military commander in charge of
defending the West Coast, General DeWitt, issued Public Proc-
lamation No. 1 establishing military areas and indicating that
"certain persons soon to be designated" would be excluded from
those areas."
The "certain persons" were designated by Public Proclama-
tion No. 3.16 That proclamation excluded Japanese, Italian, and
German aliens, as well as persons of Japanese ancestry, from
military areas.17 Moreover, Congress had made it a federal
offense to violate any regulation issued pursuant to Executive
Order 9066.'8 Therefore, the Japanese-Americans effectively
were compelled to follow the military regulations or face crimi-
nal prosecution.1"
Initially, the military encouraged alien and non-alien Japa-
Some Caucasian economic interests supported the evacuation by downplaying the contri-
bution of the Japanese-Americans to local economies in an effort to rid the marketplace
of Japanese competition. M. GRODZINS, supra at 400-10. Japanese made up one percent
of the population of California. They controlled one-half of the commercial truck crops,
even though they were not permitted to own land in their own name. M. WEGLYN, supra
note 7, at 37; See generally B. HosoKAWA, supra at 3-190 (discussion of Japanese-Ameri-
can immigration and social history from the nineteenth century to 1940). For a detailed
discussion of the pressure brought in favor of evacuation by Caucasian special interest
groups see M. GRODZINS, supra. For a list of the various groups involved see A. Bos-
woRTH, supra note 10, at 38-40.
13. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1942).
14. Id.
15. Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (1942). Oregon, California, the western
half of Washington, and the southern third of Arizona constituted Military Area No. 1.
The eastern half of the Pacific coast states and the northern two-thirds of Arizona con-
stituted Military Area No. 2. See J.L. DaWrrr, supra note 12, at 15-16.
16. Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2542 (1942).
17. Id.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1383 (repealed 1976).
19. Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (1942). Proclamation No. 5, 7 Fed. Reg.
2713, issued on March 30, 1942, made it clear the Japanese were the target of the evacu-
ation order. This proclamation established classes of persons who were exempt from the
evacuation orders. The proclamation established six exempt classes for German and Ital-
ian aliens, and only two exempt classes for Japanese citizens and aliens. See J.L.
DEWrrr, supra note 12, at 305; See also Alexandre, supra note 4, at 387-88; Freeman,
supra note 4, at 420.
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nese to voluntarily relocate outside Military Area No. 1.10 Per-
sons attempting to resettle, however, met with such hostility
they had to return to their homes.21 Responding to the failure of
"voluntary" relocation, General DeWitt issued Public Proclama-
tion No. 4 terminating that scheme." In its place, the military
adopted a compulsory relocation plan requiring Japanese-Ameri-
cans to report to designated relocation centers, 8 and prohibiting
their leaving established assembly or relocation centers without
permission.'
The military executed the evacuation and relocation within
five months."5 Many Japanese-Americans had just one week to
evacuate their homes.2 The Army allowed them to bring only
minimal belongings, requiring much to be left behind. 7
20. See J.L. DEWrrr, supra note 12, at 43-48. This note uses the word alien to refer
to persons from another country living in the United States who are not United States
citizens. See supra note 1.
21. Most Intermountain States did not want the Japanese to relocate within their
borders. Kansas required the state highway patrol to turn away Japanese trying to enter
the state. C. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 130. A typical reaction was a statement
made by the Nevada Bar Association: "We feel that if Japs are dangerous in Berkeley,
California, they are likewise dangerous to the State of Nevada." Id. at 128-30; see also
J.L. DEWrrr, supra note 12, at 106 (statements expressing similar sentiments).
22. Proclamation No. 4, 7 Fed. Reg. 2601 (1942).
23. See, e.g., Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2581 (1942). All Civilian
Exclusion Orders required reporting to civil control centers which registered all persons
of Japanese ancestry, prepared them for movement, and directed their movement to
assembly or relocation centers. General DeWitt issued 108 exclusion orders, one order
for each exclusion area. See J.L. DaWrrr, supra note 12, at 91, 115, 290 (map inserts 1,
II, and III).
24. Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982 (1942). For an explanation of
assembly centers and relocation centers see infra text accompanying notes 32-36. Exec.
Order No. 9102, 3 C.F.R. 1123 (1942), created the War Relocation Authority to supervise
the removal and long range relocation and maintenance of designated persons.
25. The first Civilian Exclusion Order was issued on March 23, 1942. Civilian Exclu-
sion Order No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2581 (1942). The military removed the last Japanese per-
son from Military Area No. 2 by August 7, 1942. D. MYERS, UPROOTED AMERICANS AND
THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY DURING WORLD WAR II 26 (1971); C. McWLLIAMS,
supra note 11, at 109.
26. See B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 12, at 319. At Terminal Island, California, the
Japanese-Americans had forty-eight hours to evacuate their homes. See A. GIRDNER & A.
LOFTIs, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: THE EVACUATION OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING
WORLD WAR II 112 (1969).
27. See R. DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA: JAPANESE-AMRI=CANS AND WORLD
WAR II 86 (1971). The Army limited the items evacuees could bring to "bedding, toilet
articles, clothing, and sufficient eating utensils for each member of the family." Id. One
author described the evacuation of Terminal Island:
Near-panic [sic] swept the community, particularly those where the family
head was in custody. Word spread quickly and human vultures in the guise of
used-furniture dealers descended on the island. They drove up and down the
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The Western Defense Command delegated authority to sev-
eral agencies to protect evacuee property.2 8 Rather than taking
direct responsibility for the property, however, the agencies
encouraged evacuees to dispose of their own property.2 9 Those
who attempted to dispose of their property were forced to do so
at distress sale prices. Even when the agencies did attempt to
take responsibility the result was inadequate,"0 causing the Jap-
anese-Americans to lose land because of inability to meet lease
and mortgage payments, lose merchandise through post-evacua-
tion looting of their stores, and lose bank accounts to unscrupu-
lous creditors.31
streets in trucks offering [five dollars] for a nearly new washing machine, [ten
dollars] for a refrigerator, [twenty-five dollars] for pianos--pittances for house-
hold goods which soon could be resold for many times the price. And the Japa-
nese, angry but helpless, sold their dearly purchased possessions because they
didn't know what to do with their goods and because they sensed the need in
the uncertain days ahead for all the cash they could squirrel away. Even so, an
employee of the Federal Security Agency visited [Terminal Island] the day
after the Japanese had left and found all manner of household equipment and
enough expensive fishing nets and rubber boots to fill eight trucks-abandoned
because there was not time to get it moved and no custodians to take
possession.
B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 12, at 310-11.
28. See D. MYERs, supra note 25, at 246. An underlying consideration of the evacua-
tion was to have a minimum of economic loss and social dislocation. See J.L. DEWrrr,
supra note 12, at 128. To minimize economic loss, the Federal Reserve Bank took charge
of storing evacuee personal property, including motor vehicles, and facilitating the liqui-
dation or management of businesses. The Farm Security Administration took charge of
protecting evacuee farm property and keeping farmlands producing food to help meet
wartime requirements. See generally J.L. DEWrrr, supra note 12, at 127-44; D. MYERS,
supra note 25, at 245-49.
29. See F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANEsE-AMERICANs 172-73
(1976).
30. See D. MYERS, supra note 25, at 247. An example of this inadequacy was the
storage of motor vehicles. The Federal Reserve Bank provided storage for cars, at the
owner's risk, without insurance, in open spaces. Consequently, the cars deteriorated rap-
idly. Id.
31. See A. GIRDNER & A. Lorrs, supra note 26, at 130-33. The Federal Reserve
Bank had the power to freeze bank accounts so creditors could not attach them. The
bank used this power on only one occasion. See D. MYERS, supra note 25, at 248.
The War Relocation Authority issued a report in 1946 entitled "The Wartime Han-
dling of Evacuee Property." This report assessed the government's failure to protect
evacuee property and listed several factors which combined to make the evacuee's sub-
stantial losses inevitable.
First of all, under stress of wartime fears and hatred, the prevailing sentiment
of the West Coast population was opposed to any recognition of the rights and
privileges of this little known and habitually misrepresented minority that was
racially associated with the enemy across the Pacific.
Second, with the evacuation a foregone conclusion, the Federal Govern-
ment was slow to set up machinery for safeguarding the property of the people
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Under the compulsory relocation plan the Japanese-Ameri-
cans first reported to assembly centers.32 These were nothing
more than hastily converted fairgrounds or racetracks used to
temporarily detain them.33 From the assembly centers the mili-
tary moved the Japanese-Americans to relocation centers"
where they remained until their release in the latter part of
1945." The relocation centers were hastily constructed bar-
racks,s3 guarded at all times, surrounded by barbed wire and
watch towers; they resembled prisons.3 7
who were to be evacuated, thus allowing an interval of golden opportunity to
swindlers and tricksters who had a terrified group of people at their mercy.
Third, when federal provisions were made for assisting evacuees with
unsolved property problems, they were inadequate to prevent. . . loss to the
absentee owners during the period when the Exclusion Orders remained in
force.
Fourth, responsibility for safeguarding evacuee property bounced from
agency to agency, finally coming to rest in the War Relocation Authority after
evacuation was an accomplished fact, well after the period when strong meas-
ures might have prevented much hardship....
Fifth, most of the local and state law enforcement authorities of the West
Coast . . . have shown a considerable indifference to vandalism and even to
arson committed upon evacuee property and have put up effective passive
resistance to requests to conduct investigations which might lead to arrest and
prosecution of offenders.
Sixth, The Western Defense Command, after ordering and conducting the
evacuation, took no direct responsibility for safeguarding physically the prop-
erty which the evacuees were obliged to leave behind them, although that
responsibility was very clearly assigned to the Western Defense Command ....
WAR RELOCATION AUroRIrv, U.S. DZP'T oF THE INTEmOR, THE WARTIMz HANDLING OF
EVACUEE PROPERTY 3-4 (1975).
32. Assembly centers were temporary detention facilities. The military created
twelve assembly centers located in California at Fresno, Marysville, Merced, Pinedale,
Pomona, Sacramento, Salinas, Santa Anita, Stockton, Tanforan, Tulare, and Turlock.
Other assembly centers were in Mayer, Arizona; Portland, Oregon; and Puyallup, Wash-
ington. J.L. DEWrrr, supra note 12, at 290 (map H).
33. See B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 12, at 322-32. The Army admitted conditions in
some kitchens did not meet Army cleanliness standards. See R. DANum, supra note 27,
at 89. But see J.L. DEWITT, supra note 12, at 195-98.
34. Relocation centers were the permanent detention facilities. The military built
ten relocation centers located at Jerome, Arkansas; Rohwer, Arkansas; Colorado River
(Poston), Arizona; Gila River, Arizona; Manzanar, California; Tule Lake, California; Gra-
nada, Colorado; Minidoka, Idaho; Central Utah (Topaz), Utah; and Heart Mountain,
Wyoming. J.L. DEWrrr, supra note 12, at 256.
35. The government closed the relocation centers by the end of 1945. Although some
residents wanted to stay, the government required all residents to leave. See D. MYanS,
supra note 25, at 203-04.
36. See B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 12, at 336; E. Spicim, A. HANsEN, K. LUOMALA &
M. OPLER, IMPOUNDED PEOPLE, JAPANssE-AMEPIcANs IN THE RELOCATIONS CEnns 71-73
(1969) [hereinafter cited as SPIcER & HANSEN].
37. See B. HOSOKAWA, supra note 12, at 329-33.
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The inadequate facilities and substandard conditions
resulted in physical and psychological injuries to many of the
internees. 8 Moreover, the communal nature of life at the reloca-
tion centers destroyed family solidarity and the moral underpin-
nings of the Japanese culture3 9 Internment humiliated the Jap-
anese-Americans; they lost pride in both themselves and their
country. 0
Release from the centers did not end the problems of Japa-
nese-Americans. Hometown citizens discouraged them from
returning to, or remaining in, their homes.' 1 These communities
instituted economic boycotts to drive the Japanese-Americans
out of business."' Most Japanese-Americans had to start their
lives over; the evacuation and internment caused the loss or
destruction of their land and assets.43
Regardless of the losses suffered in the evacuation, Japa-
nese-Americans presently have no judicially recognizable legal
claim against the United States. 44 The United States Supreme
38. Testimony before the Commission revealed instances of illness due to poor camp
conditions or lack of care. See Pacific Citizen, Aug. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 1. One man was
shot and killed. Id. at 1, col. 3. See also id., Sept. 25, 1981, at 2, col. 1; id., Aug. 21, 1981,
at 3, col. 2.
39. The Japanese family was a cohesive unit. Living and eating arrangements broke
this family unity and prevented parental control over children's behavior. See C.
MCWILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 170-74. The internment affected groups of Japanese-
Americans differently. The group most affected was the Issei (first generation) men. In
the family, the man had been the breadwinner and decision-maker. See D. KITAGAWA,
"IssEI AND NISEI" THE INTERNMENT YEARS 90-92 (1967). Each center had a governing
council but only American citizens could be on the council. The first generation were the
traditional leaders of Japanese-American society. But, with the requirement of citizen-
ship for the governing councils, the second generation became the leaders, thus destroy-
ing traditional Japanese culture. See A. BoswoRTH, supra note 10, at 151.
40. See C. McWILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 206-14, 219-22; A. GIRDNER & A. Lovrss,
supra note 26, at 238.
41. Soon after the evacuation, anti-Japanese groups began a movement to keep the
Japanese from returning. But many Japanese did return to their pre-evacuation homes.
In some instances they were greeted with acts of violence. See A. GIRDNER & A. Loris,
supra note 26, at 387-92.
42. A boycott of evacuee farm produce was organized in the Pacific Northwest. To
end this discrimination the War Relocation Authority sent in market specialists that
helped the Japanese-Americans find other outlets for their produce. In several West
Coast communities merchants refused to sell merchandise to the Japanese-Americans.
Again, the WRA was able to encourage merchants to change their policies. See D.
MYERS, supra note 25, at 200-01.
43. "Every socio-economic group save one profited from the war, for the Japanese-
Americans it was a serious economic setback. Although most did not become impover-
ished, their economic progress was significantly retarded, not only during the war but in
the post-war period as well." R. DANIELS, supra note 27, at 169.
44. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the military's actions. See
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Court has held, however, that Congress may legislate concerning
any claim arising from an equitable obligation not recognizable
in a court of law.'5 Such claims or obligations are not limited to
those of a legal character but may be grounded in general princi-
ples of right and justice.' 6 Moreover, in remedying equitable
obligations Congress is not bound by traditional legal standards.
Nonetheless, Congress has implicitly adopted standards to
assure that only meritorious claims are satisfied. Though such
standards are traditionally applied to private bills, they are
equally applicable to remedial legislation addressed to Japanese-
Americans as well. Both private claims and Japanese-American
claims involve claimants injured by government action who have
no recognizable legal claim.4 1
The standards Congress uses to evaluate private claims con-
sist of three elements.' 8 First, the government must be responsi-
ble for the private loss, as shown by the government's control
over or connection to the instrumentality that caused the loss.
Second, the party asserting the claim must have exhausted all
supra note 4. Because no legal liability attached to the government actions, no legal
remedy exists. Congress has recognized the need for redress in the past and has granted
a remedy, but this remedy was inadequate. See infra text accompaying notes 56-76. The
statute that granted relief also absolved the United States of any further liability. The
statute reads,
[P]ayment of an award shall be final and conclusive for all purposes, notwith-
standing any other provision of law to the contrary, and shall be a full dis-
charge of the United States and all of its officers, agents, servants, and employ-
ees with respect to all claims arising out of the same subject matter.
50 U.S.C. app. § 1984(d) (1976).
45. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440-41 (1896). Gellhorn & Lauer, Fed-
eral Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1325, 1327-28
(1954). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. "Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the
Debts... of the United States ... ." Id.
46. See Gellhorn & Lauer, supra note 45, at 1328. "So far as the Constitution is
concerned, Congress may legislate as it may wish concerning any claim that in its judg-
ment 'grows out of general principles of right and justice' being based on considerations
that would appeal to the 'conscience or the honor of an individual.' "Id. at 1330 (quoting
United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440 (1896)).
47. See CONGRESSIONAL QuARTmmyv's GUmE TO CONGRSS 301 (Congressional Quar-
terly, Inc., 2d ed. 1976). See generally, 1 L. JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY HANDLING FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS § 21.01 (1982). Bennett, Private Claims Acts and Congressional Refer-
ences, 9 U.S.A.F. JAG L. Rav. 9 (1967). The distinction between a private bill and a
public bill is that a private bill is for relief of individual persons whereas a public bill
relates to public matters and deals with individuals by classes. CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY'S GuIDE TO CONGRESS, supra, at 301.
48. Gellhorn & Lauer, supra note 45, at 1331. Gellhorn and Lauer derived these
standards from review of committee records, personal interviews, and an examination of
the legislative product, Id. at 1330.
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available remedies. Finally, the claimant must be free from
fault."9
Under these standards, Japanese-American claims based on
internment injury warrant Congressional action." The executive
branch of government, through both the President and the mili-
tary, was responsible for the orders activating, and the actions
executing, the evacuation and internment-the instrumentalities
causing the loss. All non-Congressional remedies are exhausted
because none are available. The Supreme Court, by accepting
military necessity as the grounds for validating the evacuation,
precluded adjudication of claims on tort (under the Federal Tort
Claims Act)8 ' and constitutional theories.2 Finally, the Japa-
nese-Americans are free from fault. The previously discussed
history of the evacuation and internment" demonstrates that
most Japanese-American losses resulted from the government-
instituted evacuation and internment rather than action proving
bad faith or less than reasonable conduct on the part of the
evacuees themselves."
Congress, implicitly applying these standards,55 adopted the
Evacuation Claims Act of 1948." The purpose of the Act was to
allow adjudication of Japanese-American claims against the
United States for losses arising out of their evacuation from the
49. Id. at 1334. Although Gellhorn and Lauer identify five elements, only the three
identified above address the substantive merits of the private claim. The remaining two
elements discussed by Gellhorn and Lauer relate to the availability of other remedies. Id.
50. Opponents to redress argue that allowing recovery to the Japanese-Americans
will set a precedent for recovery by other minority groups. See Pacific Citizen, Aug. 14,
1981, at 10, col. 2. The use of standards to determine the merit of claims aids Congress in
distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate claims.
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976). The waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply
to claims arising out of the military's combatant activities during times of war. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(j) (1976). The Federal Tort Claims Act also has a two year statute of limitations.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). The internment camps were closed in late 1945. See supra
note 35 and accompanying text. The two year time period to bring suit expired in the
later part of 1947. Research has not disclosed any suit against the United States govern-
ment under the Tort Claims Act.
52. See supra note 44.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 25-41. The reason for the evacuation and
internment was fear of espionage and sabotage, yet, no Japanese-American was ever con-
victed of these crimes. See supra note 12.
54. H.R. RE. No. 732, 80th Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2297, 2301.
55. See id.
56. Japanese Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 836, 62 Stat. 1231 (current
version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1981-87 (1976)).
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West Coast during World War 11.57 The Act authorized the
Attorney General to "determine according to law" any claim for
damage to real or personal property that is a reasonable and
natural consequence of the evacuation, and to settle claims up to
$2,500.6
The Act was inadequate to address losses suffered during
the internment. First, the Attorney General interpreted the Act
to require an adjudication of each claim, thus slowing down the
claims process"9 and requiring the production of documentary or
corroborative evidence ° often lost or destroyed during the evac-
uation. As a result many meritorious claims were dismissed. Sec-
ond, because the $2,500 settlement limitation did not cover most
property claims, forty percent of the lawful claimants had to
wait for Congressional appropriations to receive payments.61
Third, the Act did not allow claims for death, personal injury,
physical hardship, mental suffering, or loss of anticipated profits
or earnings.62 Finally, the Act imposed burdensome time restric-
tions requiring claimants to file their claims within eighteen
months after passage of the Act."
Congress rectified some of these problems by two amend-
ments to the Act." The first amendment, passed in 1951, elimi-
57. See H.R. REP. No. 732, 80th Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2297.
58. Japanese Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 836, § 4, 62 Stat. 1231
(1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1981 (1976)). As currently enacted, the Act
allows recovery only for damages not covered by insurance. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1981(a)
(1976). The Act provides compensation for damages resulting from voluntary evacuation.
50 U.S.C. app. § 1981(b)(1) (1976).
59. By the January 3, 1950, deadline, Japanese-Americans had filed 23,924 claims.
In the year 1950 the Attorney General only settled two hundred ten claims. Claims were
being processed at a rate of four per month. The cost to the government to handle a four
hundred fifty dollar claim was one thousand dollars. See A. GIRDNER & A. Lorris, supra
note 26, at 433-34.
60. The original Act required an adjudication to determine the amount of damages
the Attorney General would pay. Japanese Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, Pub. L. No.
836, § 4(a), 62 Stat. 1231 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1981 (1976)). The
Attorney General required the evacuee who did not have documentation of loss to intro-
duce sworn testimony of a witness that knew the evacuee actually owned the property
claimed. The adjudication did not permit hearsay or secondary evidence. See F. CHUMAN,
supra note 29, at 241.
61. See F. CHUMAN, supra note 29, at 241.
62. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1982(b)(4-5) (1976). The Act barred these claims because they
were perceived as speculative and more difficult to appraise than property loss. See 1948
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 2299.
63. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1982(a) (1976). All claims not filed within the eighteen month
period were barred. Id.
64. Japanese Evacuation Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 116, 65 Stat. 192 (1951). Japanese-
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nated the adjudication requirement. The amendment allowed
the Attorney General to settle claims for the lesser of three-
fourths of the total amount or $2,500.1 This facilitated rapid
settlement of most pending claims." The second amendment,
passed in 1956, increased the amount the Attorney General
could offer for settlement of claims to $100,000.11 Congress
passed this amendment because the remaining unsettled claims
exceeded the $2,500 limit."
Regardless of the amendments, the Evacuation Claims Act
still proved inadequate.' Procedural barriers such as proof of
ownership and settlement restrictions70 prevented sufficient
compensation to claimants. Also the amended Act did not com-
pensate for lost income, death, and physical injury. 1 While the
Federal Reserve Bank estimated property loss to be
$400,000,000,71 the government paid only $38,000,000 in dam-
ages87 not accounting for accumulated interest or post war infla-
tion.74' Moreover, of the eligible 110,000 claimants,75  only
approximately 24,000 of those claimants filed within the eight-
een month period. 7s Thus, the government compensated roughly
one-fifth of the persons injured for less than ten percent of their
property losses.
To date Congress has not acted to correct the inadequacy of
the Evacuation Claims Act. Given the merit of Japanese-Ameri-
can claims and the ineffectiveness of the previous remedy, Con-
gressional action to devise an effective remedial plan is neces-
American Evacuation Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 673, 70 Stat. 513 (1956).
65. Japanese Evacuation Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 116 § 7, 65 Stat. 192 (1951).
66. The 1951 amendment facilitated the settlement of 19,750 claims by June 30,
1954. See A. GiRDNER & A. Lorris, supra note 26, at 434.
67. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1981(a) (originally enacted as Japanese-American Evacuation
Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 674, 70 Stat. 513 (1956)).
68. Before the 1956 amendment, the 1,936 claims that remained to be settled were
above the $2500 limit. 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 3057-
58.




73. See R. DANIELS, supra note 27, at 168.
74. See F. CHUMAN, supra note 29, at 243-44.
75. Subcommittee on Japanese-American Redress/Reparations, Legal Services Sec-
tion, State Bar of California, Japanese-Americans Redress and Reparations: A Basis for
Congressional Action (July 1981) (report submitted at public hearing before Commission
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Washington, D.C.).
76. See A. GIRDNER & A. Lorris, supra note 26, at 21.
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sary. Congress, recognizing the continuing merit of Japanese-
American claims, recently established a commission to investi-
gate the causes of the internment and, if appropriate, to recom-
mend remedial legislation.7 The remainder of this article exam-
ines the goals a remedy should seek to achieve and analyzes the
four primary plans warranting consideration.
The potential goals remedial legislation for Japanese-Ameri-
cans must seek to achieve are broad and diverse. By definition
such legislation should provide compensation for the losses suf-
fered. But other goals are important as well. Remedying Japa-
nese-American losses provides a unique opportunity to educate
the American people regarding the potential abuse of any
racially defined action and to deter future occurrences through
facilitating the elimination of discrimination. Additionally, to
avoid the problems experienced under the Evacuation Claims
Act a plan must be administratively efficient. This comment
does not attempt to consider all possible goals, but merely to
apply the above goals78 to analyze the various remedies pro-
posed. Japanese-American groups have proposed four redress
plans. Under the first plan (the direct payment plan), Congress
would compensate individual Japanese-Americans by paying a
fixed amount to those who were interned.7 9 The second plan (the
individualized compensation plan) calls for Congress to establish
categories of injury and compensate internees according to the
type of injuries sustained.80 The third redress plan (the group
compensation plan) requires group compensation through Con-
gressional establishment of a charitable corporation.8 With the
fourth plan (the mixed plan) Congress would provide both indi-
vidual and group compensation for injuries suffered by the Japa-
nese-Americans.8 '
77. See supra note 6.
78. These purposes parallel those of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians. 126 CONG. REC. H6207 (daily ed. July 21, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Danielson). See Asian Law Association, Prepared Statement of Asian Law Association
(1981) (statement presented by B. Aburano before the Commission on Wartime Reloca-
tion and Internment of Civilians). Asian Law Association consists of a group of young
attorneys of Asian descent who work and reside in the Seattle area.
79. See infra note 97 at 3-7, 19-20.
80. See S. Castelnuovo, With Liberty and Justice for Some: The Case for Compen-
sation to Japanese-Americans Imprisoned During World War II 15-17 (Sept. 1981)
(unpublished manuscript available from the author, Professor of Political Science,
Northeastern Illinois University).
81. See infra note 97, at 9-15, 20-22.
82. See S. Castelnuovo, supra note 80 at 15.
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The first plan provides for direct government payments to
injured individuals following the precedent set by previous war-
time compensation plans. In the past, Congress has provided
individual compensation for both internment and property dam-
age resulting from wartime actions. American civilians interned
by enemy governments during wartimess have received detention
benefits under the War Claims Act."4 During World War II,
interned American citizens received sixty dollars per month.85
Congress adjusted the amount for subsequent wars; most
recently during the Vietnam War, interned American citizens
received one hundred fifty dollars per month.8
Congress has also compensated individuals for property
damage resulting from wartime actions. The Rehabilitation of
the Philippines Act compensated Philippine citizens whose
property was damaged during World War 11.87 While the Act
limited compensation to damage resulting from certain enumer-
ated perils," damage resulting from actions taken by the United
83. The conflicts in which Congress gave detention benefits include World War II,
the Korean conflict, and the Vietnam conflict. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2001-17 (1976).
84. Id. The purpose of the War Claims Act is to provide relief for internees. 1948
U.S. CODE CONG. Sxnv., 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2317. This relief is "a symbolic gesture on
the part of the United States expressing recognition of the hardship suffered by the ben-
eficiaries." S. REP. No. 878, 91st Cong. 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, 3303, 3306. "[The bill] provides payment for all civilian American citizens
who are held captive by the North Vietnam forces at the rate of $60 per month, which is
in addition to any payments they may receive under the Missing Persons, Defense Base,
or War Hazard Acts." Id.
85. S. REP. No. 878, supra note 84, at 3305. Internees under eighteen received
twenty-five dollars per month. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2004(c) (1976).
86. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2004(i)(4) (1976).
87. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1751-1806 (1976). "The Commission is authorized to make
compensation to the extent hereinafter provided on account of physical loss or destruc-
tion of, or damage to, property in the Philippines occuring after December 7, 1941 (Phil-
ippine time) and before October 1, 1945." 50 U.S.C. app. § 1752(a) (Omitted 1951). See
generally, Delgado, The Philippine War Damage Commission: A Factual Summary of
Its Work, 38 A.B.A. J. 32 (1952); Schein, War Damage Compensation Through Rehabil-
itation: The Philippine War Damage Commission, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 519
(1951).
88. The enumerated perils include:
(1) enemy attack; (2) action taken by or at the request of the military, naval, or
air forces of the United States to prevent property from coming into possession
of the enemy; (3) action taken by enemy representatives, civil or military, or by
the representative of any government cooperating with the enemy; (4) action
taken by the armed forces of the United States or other forces cooperating
with the armed forces of the United States in opposing, resisting, or expelling
the enemy from the Philippines; (5) the looting, pillage or other lawlessness or
disorder accompanying the collapse of civil authority determined by this Com-
mission to have resulted from any of the other perils enumerated in this sec-
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States military in opposing the enemy was one of those compen-
sable perils."9
Congressman Mike Lowry, in 1979, introduced legislation
establishing a direct payment compensation plan." The aim of
the legislation was to recognize and redress injuries received in
the evacuation and internment, and to discourage similar action
in the future."1 The Attorney General would implement the plan
by paying any interned individual a sum of $15,000 plus $15 per
day of internment.92 If the internee is deceased or cannot be
located the legal heirs would receive the damage payment."3
Additionally, the plan allows the Attorney General the use of
government records to determine who was interned and the
number of days interned. 4
The direct payment plan fails to meet the compensatory
goal. The plan provides compensation for an amount equal to
the total aggregate property loss" but makes individualized dis-
tion or from control by enemy forces.
50 U.S.C. app. § 1752(a) (omitted 1951).
89. Id. In opposing the enemy, the military also caused the Japanese-American's
injuries. See supra text accompanying notes 9-43.
The Supreme Court upheld the evacuation as a valid exercise of the war powers. See
supra note 4. Further support for individual compensation is found in the payment the
United States made to the United States citizens taken hostage in Iran. See The Presi-
dent's Commission on Hostage Compensation, The Final Report and Recommendations
of The President's Commission on Hostage Compensation (1981).
90. H.R. 5977, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H11319 (daily ed. Nov. 28,
1979). Congress did not pass this bill in the 96th Congress. The bill has not been
reintroduced.
91. The stated purpose of the Act is:
(1) to recognize and redress the injustices and violations of human rights per-
petrated during the World War II internment period against individuals of
Japanese ancestry by the United States; (2) to discourage similar injustices and
violati6ns of human rights in the future; and (3) to make more credible and
sincere the declarations of concern by the United States over violations of
human rights committed by other nations.
Id. at § 2.
92. Id. at § 4(a)(1).
93. Id. at § 4(2)(A-D).
94. Id. at § 4(b).
In determining . . . the number of days that an eligible individual was
interned or detained or forcibly relocated, the Secretary shall use any available
records from the Wartime Civil Control Administration and the War Reloca-
tion Authority and shall obtain, if the Attorney General determines it is neces-
sary, affidavits from eligible individuals and witnesses.
Id.
95. The Federal Reserve Bank estimated Japanese-American property losses at $400
million in 1942 dollars. See supra text accompanying note 72. Accounting for interest
and inflation, Japanese-American groups have estimated loss from property damage
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bursements based only on days interned, not the individual's
actual property loss. As a result, the flat sum payment may
overcompensate some individuals whose injuries were not as
extensive as others, and at the same time, not fully compensate
those whose injuries were more severe. Moreover, it suffers the
same defect as the Evacuation Claims Act." The direct payment
plan has no mechanism for compensating individual injuries
such as death, personal injury, emotional distress, and lost earn-
ings, thus failing to compensate injuries Japanese-Americans
suffered as a result of the internment.
The direct payment plan fails in other respects as well. The
plan will not discourage the recurrence of similar governmental
action. First, while monetary damages traditionally serve to
deter undesirable conduct as well as compensate victims,9 pay-
ment of substantial damages by the United States government
would only stand as a reminder of the possible consequences of
its actions, and as an historic precedent for potential victims of a
future internment. Arguably such a reminder and historic prece-
dent could deter similar future actions, but given the vast mone-
tary resources of the United States government, the deterrent
effect of the direct payment plan would be negligible. Second, by
paying substantial damages, the United States would not be
legally bound to prevent a future internment. Nor would pay-
ment of damages guarantee the government would be punished
for similar future actions. Finally, the direct payment plan does
not address racial discrimination, an underlying cause of the
internment.9
The plan also fails to educate the American public about
the internment. A number of common misperceptions remain
prevalent: that Japanese-Americans supported Japan in the war
effort;" that they engaged in sabotage and espionage; 100 that the
evacuation and subsequent internment were justified because
individual loyalty could not be determined at the time;10 1 that
alone to be three billion dollars. Nat'l L.J., Aug. 3, 1981 at 6, col. 1.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 25-41.
97. See Asian Law Association, Prepared Statement of Asian Law Association
(1981) (statement presented by B. Aburano before the Commission on Wartime Reloca-
tion and Internment of Civilians).
98. Id. at 2. See supra text accompanying notes 3-12.
99. See Seriguchi & Abe, 1980 Japanese America: Contemporary Perspectives on
Internment, 34-35 (proceedings of conferences held in the State of Washington).
100. See supra note 12.
101. Id. See also supra note 99.
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the United States government is not responsible for the serious
injuries it caused its own citizens through the internment.1 0 2 The
direct payment plan does nothing to dispel these mispercep-
tions. The only educational effect of the plan is through media
attention surrounding the payment process. 08 But because the
plan itself requires only a short time to execute, media coverage
would also be short and would provide no assurance that the
American public's understanding of the evacuation and intern-
ment would increase.
The primary advantage of the direct payment plan is its
administrative simplicity. The claims process is simple. The
Attorney General would base awards on government records, not
on individual claims, thus keeping costs to a minimum and
avoiding the problems of the Evacuation Claims Act. This single
advantage, however, is insufficient to overcome the substantial
failures of this plan.
A second proposed compensation plan utilizes a major por-
tion of the Federal Compensation Law of Germany (hereinafter
BEG) as a model.M0 The West German government designed the
BEG to compensate German residents' °" victimized by Nazi
Germany. Like the Japanese-Americans, the beneficiaries of the
BEG were citizens injured by their own government during war-
time. In both situations race discrimination was a basis for the
government's actions.es
102. See supra note 99. One comment is typical: "I feel that reparation should be
made to the Japanese-Americans interned, but by the Japanese government. Japan
started the war, we didn't. We chose the best means available at the time to protect
ourselves---or we thought." Id.
103. See text accompanying note 78.
104. See INSTrrUT OF JEWISH AFFAIRS, WORLD 4EWISH CONGRESS, THE (WEST GER-
MAN) FEDERAL COMPENSATION LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTARY REGULATIONS (N. Robinson
trans. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WEST GERMAN COMPENSATION LAW]. As noted in the
text the West German law itself is referred to as BEG.
105. The BEG also compensates people who belong to the German sphere of lan-
guage and culture. Schwerin, German Compensation For Victims of Nazi Persecution,
67 Nw. U.L. REv. 479, 509 (1972).
106. One reason for the evacuation of Japanese-Americans was race discrimination.
See supra note 12. Race discrimination also was one basis for the Jewish persecution by
the Nazi government in Germany. See Schwerin, supra note 105, at 481-84. However,
perhaps because of its dictatorial form of government with fewer inherent checks and
balances than that of a democratic government such as in the United States, the German
government could more severely and extensively injure the Jewish people than could the
American government injure people of Japanese ancestry. See S. Castelnuovo, supra
note 80, at 13. This distinction indicates that a remedial plan for Japanese-Americans
might not have to be as comprehensive as the BEG was for the Nazi persecuted.
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The individualized compensation plan has the advantage of
procedural simplicity for the claimant. To settle evacuee claims,
compensation offices would be established in key cities through-
out the country.10 7 Applications for compensation would be filed
at these offices and would disclose the nature of the injuries sus-
tained, any substantiating evidence of those injuries, and the
amount of payment received under the Evacuation Claims Act,
if any. 08 The compensation office would investigate the claim by
gathering all available evidence "09 and use it to make a settle-
ment determination. 110 If the parties could not reach a final set-
tlement, either party would be allowed to submit the claim to
the Federal Court of Claims with final appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.1
The individualized compensation' plan uses the BEG as a
model to determine who would be compensated and what inju-
ries would be compensable. As with the BEG any individual who
was interned, regardless of United States citizenship or resi-
dence would be eligible for compensation. 12 If an internee is
dead, the heirs may file a claim.113 The BEG uses several catego-
107. Examples of such key cities include San Francisco, Portland, Seattle, Chicago,
and New York. An office could be established wherever a significant number of Japa-
nese-Americans live.
108. WEST GERMAN COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 104, at 42 (BEG § 190). This
would allow introduction of evidence if any existed and would avoid the evidentiary
problems that the Japanese Evacuation Claims Act produced.
109. Examples of organizations that may have pertinent records include the Federal
Reserve Bank, The Bank of Tokyo, the War Relocation Authority, and prewar tax
statements.
110. BEG § 176 provides for a similar procedure. WEST GERMAN COMPENSATION LAW,
supra note 104, at 55-56. If no conclusive or convincing evidence can be found, the fact
may be established in favor of the claimant. Id. at 56. The United States Department of
the Interior uses a similar claims procedure to investigate claims filed for damage caused
by irrigation projects. See Gellhorn & Lauer, supra note 45, at 1344-50.
111. See S. Castelnuovo, supra note 80. Additionally, the plan would provide legal
aid to those who could not afford to appeal the settlement decision. Id.
112. The BEG provided limited compensation to stateless persecutees who were not
part of the German sphere of culture and influence. WEST GERMAN COMPENSATION LAW,
supra note 104, at 49-52. BEG §§ 149-66. During World War II, the United States not
only imprisoned Japanese-Americans but also persons from the Aleutians and Japanese
from South America. The United States secured the cooperation of South American gov-
ernments in the arrest and deportation of their respective Japanese populations. The
United States paid for the transportation of South American Japanese to the United
States and interned them in relocation centers upon their arrival. At its peak the number
of interned Japanese from South America exceeded two thousand. See M. WEGLYN,
supra note 7, at 56-66.
113. WEST GERMAN COMPENSATION LAW, supra note 104, at 8 (BEG § 1). See also S.
Castelnuovo, supra note 80, at 16.
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ries to define the various injuries suffered by the persecuted and
to establish minimum and maximum levels of compensation for
each category.1 1' The individualized compensation plan could
apply any of the following categories to Japanese-American
claims: loss of life,11 5 damage to property," 6 damage to posses-
sion,1 7 damage to health or limb,"' and damage to economic
and vocational pursuits. 19 Likewise, Congress could establish
minimum and maximum amounts recoverable under each cate-
gory by analyzing the type of injury suffered and determining its
worth.120
The individualized compensation plan compares more
favorably than the direct payment plan to the goals of remedial
legislation. The use of BEG categories allows flexibility sufficient
to assess and compensate individual injuries beyond the prop-
erty loss provided for under both the Evacuation Claims Act and
the direct payment plan. Additionally, the categories assure that
individuals will be more accurately compensated for injuries
actually suffered, thus avoiding the inequitable payment prob-
lem of the direct payment plan. 21
The individual compensation plan more successfully
addresses the deterrence and educational goals than the direct
payment plan. Since the individualized compensation plan is
more inclusive in the injuries it could compensate, it may be
more costly. If deterrent effect is proportional to cost, a future
114. The BEG divides injuries into seven categories which include: loss of life, dam-
age to limb and health, damage to liberty, damage to property, damage to possessions,
losses incurred through payment of discriminatory levies, fines, penalties and costs, and
damage to vocation and economic pursuits. WEST GERMAN COMPENSATION LAW, supra
note 104, at 8 (BEG § 1).
115. Compensation under the BEG for loss of life includes compensation for both
deliberate and unintentional killing, as long as there is a "probable" nexus between
death and persecution. Id. at 11-12 (BEG § 15).
116. The BEG defines property compensation as any tangible object belonging to a
person which was damaged, destroyed or defaced, or left to be looted. Id. at 50 (BEG §
51).
117. Under the BEG damage to possessions includes impairment of use of property
or possessions, or damage caused by a boycott. Id. at 23 (BEG § 56).
118. Damage to health or limb, as defined by the BEG, requires damage that
resulted in a lasting impairment of mental or physical faculties that had a probable
nexus to the persecution. Id. at 17 (BEG § 28).
119. Damage to vocational pursuits is defined as damage to use of working power
and includes interruption of pre-vocational training. Id. at 26, 39-40 (BEG §§ 65, 115).
Damage to economic pursuits covers loss of insurance benefits. Id. at 42-45 (BEG §§ 127-
38).
120. See S. Castelnuovo, supra note 80.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 95-103.
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internment is less likely under this plan than under the direct
payment plan. Moreover, though the plan has no means to elimi-
nate discrimination or educate the American public, media
attention would be of longer duration since the plan itself would
take longer to administer. Additionally, media attention to the
BEG type categories would increase the public's awareness.
For the claimant the individualized compensation plan is
administratively simple. All that is required is the filing of writ-
ten evidence. Adversary proceedings are unnecessary; the
administrative problems of the Evacuation Claims Act are
thereby avoided. 22 However, the administrative cost to the gov-
ernment is greater than the administrative cost of the direct
payment plan. The government would have to establish and
maintain offices throughout the country for a specified period of
time. Additionally, the claims procedure requires the investiga-
tion of each claim and the use of government records to aid in
settlement determinations. This individualized investigation and
settlement would thus be more costly than a direct payment to
internees.1 3
Instead of direct or individualized compensation, Congress
could choose a third alternative: group compensation. The idea
of federal group compensation is not new. Congress relied on a
group compensation scheme in the Rehabilitation of the Philip-
pines Act 24 and in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.1
2 5
Under the Rehabilitation of the Philippines Act, Congress pro-
vided for rebuilding the entire Philippine economy after World
War 11.126 Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Con-
gress gave an extensive system of land and monetary grants to
Alaskan natives. 27 The Asian Law Association has suggested
122. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
123. The United States government uses similar claims procedures in processing
claims against the Department of the Interior and claims against the Post Office. See
Gellhorn & Lauer, supra note 45, at 1342-50, 1358-60.
124. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1751-1806 (1976).
125. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (1976).
126. The Act provided for rebuilding roads, ports and harbors, improving public
health services, restoring inter-island commerce, training persons for the merchant
marines, establishing inter-island air facilities, meteorological facilities, and rehabilitat-
ing the fisheries. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1782-1790 (omitted 1951). The reason for this relief
was to rebuild the Philippine economy, which had been destroyed by World War I, and
to allow the Philippines to become independent from the United States. See S. REP. No.
755, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1144.
127. The purpose of the grants was to quiet claims of aboriginal land titles. 43
U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976).
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that the group compensation plan take the form of a charitable
non-profit corporation. 12 8 Corporations previously established by
Congress129 have had specific statutory purposes defining the
reason for the corporation's existence and limiting its powers.13 0
The statutory purpose of creating a corporation for Japa-
nese-Americans would be to recognize the injuries caused by the
internment and, in an attempt to redress those injuries, to fund
projects that benefit Japanese-Americans.131 Funding could
focus on projects designed to benefit internees. For example,
because internment took place forty years ago, many internees
are now elderly. Thus, projects benefiting the elderly such as
senior centers, health care centers, and low income housing
could be funded.1 3 2 Japanese-Americans also have suggested
financing businesses, research, religious and community struc-
tures, and educational scholarships.33 As part of redressing inju-
ries, the corporation could also fund programs to educate the
American public about the internment and programs to elimi-
nate discrimination.1"
Under the group compensation plan a board of directors,
elected by the Japanese-American community, would administer
the non-profit corporation. Internees and direct descendents of
internees would be eligible to vote for directors.1 6 The board of
directors would determine the projects to fund with input from
those eligible to vote. The statute creating the corporation would
allow input into funding decisions by creating local committees
of eligible voters to determine local funding priorities. The local
committees would report their decisions to the board of direc-
tors who would make funding decisions in light of local
priorities.136
128. See supra note 97 at 9-15, 20-22.
129. See, e.g., Corp. for Public Broadcasting, 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1976); Legal Services
Corp., 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1976).
130. The purpose of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is to assist in the
development of public television and radio broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1976). The
purpose of the Legal Services Corporation is to provide legal assistance to those who
cannot afford it. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1976).
131. See supra note 97, at 21.
132. Id.
133. See S. Castelnuovo, supra note 80, at 7.
134. See supra note 97, at 21.
135. Eligible voters would be ascertained from government records.
136. The statute creating the Legal Services Corporation uses a similar idea. The
statute requires state advisory councils to oversee the expenditures of the Legal Services
Corporation within each state, and requires the councils to report back to the corpora-
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The group compensation plan also provides mechanisms to
insure that the corporation fulfills its statutory duty and to
insure its responsiveness to the Japanese-American community.
The General Accounting Office would audit the corporation
annually. 13 7 In addition, the corporation would submit annual
reports to Congress of expenditures, financial conditions, opera-
tions, activities, and accomplishments.' 8 To insure responsive-
ness to the Japanese-American community, the corporation
would publish an annual report of its activities and expendi-
tures, and hold an annual meeting to discuss the report.139 Addi-
tionally, corporate responsiveness would be insured by allowing
eligible Japanese-Americans to vote on very large expenditures
or major decisions.
Congress would fund the corporation with an amount deter-
mined by an assessment of the value of compensation injuries.
This amount could be paid outright to the corporation, or paid
over a period of years. " The corporation would decide whether
to allocate all monies received to funding projects, or whether to
protect some capital through investment, thus creating a corpo-
ration of longer duration.
The group compensation plan is the least effective plan in
meeting the compensatory goal but has great potential for meet-
ing the deterrence and educational goals. On one hand, funding
projects that benefit Japanese-Americans does not guarantee
that internees would be compensated. In fact, funding of
projects could create the opposite result. Those persons not
interned could receive the greatest benefit from the plan.4 But
on the other hand, the plan has some preventive effect through
payment of damages,1'2 and also could fund programs directed
toward eliminating discrimination and educating the American
people about the internment. The desired effect of this funding
tion. 42 U.S.C. § 2996(c) (1976).
137. Congress requires most corporations to be audited annually. See, e.g, Legal
Services Corp., 42 U.S.C. 2996(h) (1976); Corp. for Public Broadcasting, 47 U.S.C. §
396(1) (1976).
138. See supra note 97, at 14.
139. Id. at 21-22.
140. Congress did this under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. 43 U.S.C. §
1605 (1976).
141. Even if Congress structured the remedy as previously suggested, since most
internees are elderly, arguably, the younger generations, who were least injured, will
receive the greatest benefit from this plan. See S. Castelnuovo, supra note 80, at 12.
142. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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is to increase understanding about the internment and its
causes, thus decreasing the likelihood of a similar occurrence in
the future.
Administratively, the group compensation plan is also more
costly than the direct payment plan. The group compensation
plan requires an organization to elect directors, solicit input
from. local levels and report to both Congress and the Japanese-
American community. Additionally, a staff may be necessary to
implement these requirements and to administer the funding
process. The administrative requirements of this plan are similar
in magnitude to the individualized compensation plan.
The final and most effective plan combines individual and
group compensation. Precedent for a mixed plan exists under
both the Rehabilitation of the Philippines Act' and the West
German BEG. The Rehabilitation of the Philippines Act com-
pensated individuals for property damage14 4 and facilitated the
rebuilding of the Philippine economy at the same time. 45 Under
the BEG individuals were compensated for their actual injury,
but unclaimed compensation went to private organizations who
used the funding for various community service projects.14" One
scholar has suggested a mixed plan that is a modification of the
individualized compensation plan. 47
The mixed plan would provide compensation to injured
individuals as described in the individualized compensation
plan.148 Compensation offices would be established to process
individual claims. The amount of compensation would be deter-
mined by the use of BEG categories which identify the type of
injury compensable and the minimum and maximum amounts
recoverable for each category.
The group compensation aspect would adopt a form of the
charitable corporation previously discussed. 49 The corporation
would assert claims of persons who either do not wish to make a
claim' 50 or had claims but died without descendents. Claims
143. 50 U.S.C. app. 1782-90 (1976).
144. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
145. Id.
146. See Schwerin, supra note 105, at 514.
147. See S. Castelnuovo, supra note 80.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 107-20.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 131-40.
150. H. Miyatake, C. Kato, K. Nukano, K. Seriguchi, E. Somekawa & T. Scott,
Redress for Aleut and Nikkei Americans (Sept. 10, 1981) (copy of materials used in testi-
mony before the U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians at
19821
University of Puget Sound Law Review
asserted would be limited to readily ascertainable types of inju-
ries. As in the group compensation plan,'5 ' the corporation
would use the money recovered to fund projects that benefit
Japanese-Americans. Local committees would give the board of
directors input into local funding priorities with the directors
making the final funding decisions.
The mixed plan is the most effective plan for meeting the
goals of a remedy for Japanese-Americans. The compensatory
goal is met since all injured persons are compensated for their
injuries through the use of categories with minimum and maxi-
mum amounts of recovery for each type of injury. Additionally,
because the corporation would pursue unasserted claims and
claims to heirless property, even claims traditionally not recog-
nized are enforced. Thus, awards are made for all compensable
injuries. The group compensation aspect of the mixed plan also
meets the preventive goals by funding projects that educate the
American public about the internment and that facilitate the
elimination of discrimination.
Administratively the mixed plan is the most costly remedy
plan. It requires not only a system of compensation offices to
investigate individual claims, but also a corporate structure to
make claims for heirless property " and to administer monies
received to fund projects that benefit Japanese-American
groups.5 3 The substantial benefits of the mixed plan, however,
justify the higher administrative expense.
To this point this comment has avoided discussing the
amount of compensation an effective remedy must provide. Any
monetary remedy will be costly and perhaps unpopular. Socially
and politically, any remedy may result in more, rather than less,
discrimination against Japanese-Americans. The Japanese-
Americans are the most successful minority group both profes-
sionally and economically."' Editorials have suggested that
because of this subsequent success, Japanese-Americans are not
entitled to any remedy."' If that view is widely held legislation
the Sept. 10, 1981, hearing in Seattle, Washington).
151. Id.
152. This includes Japanese-Americans who do not wish to submit a claim. Id.
153. This includes funding projects that educate the American public about the
internment and projects that facilitate the elimination of discrimination.
154. See Seriguchi & Abe, supra note 99. See also New York Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at
14 col. 2.
155. See New York Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at 14, col. 2; Wall Street Journal, Aug. 11,
1978, at 10, col. 2.
[Vol. 6:97
Japanese-American Internment
providing any remedy could result in a "social backlash" against
Japanese-Americans. Furthermore, the greater the amount of
compensation, the greater the likelihood of adverse public reac-
tion. The injuries Japanese-Americans suffered, however, are not
limited to mere property loss; neither should the compensation
Congress provides. Congress should pay the full obligation how-
ever costly. Congress must not allow high cost and possible
adverse public reaction to obscure the fact that it has an unmet
obligation. The obligation extends to injuries encompassing
physical, emotional and cultural injury as well as property loss.
The mixed plan provides the flexibility for Congress to compen-
sate all injuries fully. At the same time the plan has the educa-
tional and deterrent ability to minimize social backlash and
avoid a recurrence of similar governmental actions. In other
words the plan allows Congress to meet its obligation effectively.
The evacuation and internment of thousands of civilians
during World War II is a sad epoch in American history. Under
the guise of military necessity United States citizens were
uprooted from their homes, frequently severed from family and
friends, and suffered millions of dollars in property loss alone.
To date Congress has adopted only a half-hearted and mini-
mally effective plan to compensate these losses.
Through the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, Congress has the opportunity to ade-
quately assess the extent of injury caused and develop a proper
plan of compensation. Various groups have proposed numerous
alternative plans. The plan that most effectively provides
redress for the harms done relies on both individual compensa-
tion by assessing individual injury and group compensation
through educational and other community projects. Most impor-
tantly, the plan allows Congress to finally address in full the
equitable obligation owed to the Japanese-American people. The
claims are meritorious; the obligation exists; Congress should
act.
Cindy K. Smith
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